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WHO INVENTED DEVOLUTION? 
Owen Dudley Edwards 
Devolution in the British Isles, in its most abstract sense, is a question 
older than the Union of British Parliaments of 1707, older than the Union of 
British Crowns of 1603, lost in a late thirteenth-century Ireland when the 
governor of the English King's Papal-granted Irish Lordship extended his 
council into parliaments. The most durable example of devolution in these 
islands, the Isle of Man, is today ostensibly based on the Isle of Man Customs, 
Harbours and Public Purposes Act (1866) and succeeding legislation but the 
powers of Home Rule exist on the Manx foundation of the Tynwald, older 
than the Westminster Parliament, though apparently younger than the 
thousand-year-old Icelandic Althing. Manx government from England is 
younger than the English Lordship of Ireland, older than the English Kingship 
of Ireland, Man being the most substantial Scottish possession to remain 
permanently lost after Scotland itself had been won back under the Bruces. 
But Westminster acknowledgement of Man's devolutionary status derived 
from the lack of any Manx representation at Westminster. It is little 
acknowledged, but we may see here a precedent followed in the lack of Irish 
representation at Westminster under the First Irish Home Rule Bill {1886), 
abandoned with its abridged retention under the Second Irish Home Rule Bill 
{1893), and at the heart of the "West Lothian Question" raised by Tam 
Dalyell, MP, during the Scottish devolution controversy of the later 1970s. 
The antiquity of the Tynwald, stretching back to the tenth century, offers 
another precedent. The search for constitutional independence or devolution 
in Ireland and Scotland has been shaped around the tradition of a former 
national Parliament. It seems ironic that this theme has been more strongly 
asserted by Irish devolutionists than by Scots. The Scots, as a separate 
kingdom, really had an independent parliament before Union. The Irish in 
1782-83 for the first time since 1494 obtained nominal independence for their 
Parliament, enduring until the Union of 1800, but in practice it never escaped 
from Whitehall domination; the medieval Irish Parliament was of English 
origin, first coming into sharp focus under Edwards I's Justiciar, a Welshman 
rejoicing in the name of John Wogan. The legislation of 1494, known as 
Poynings' Law from Henry VII's viceroy, prohibited the calling of Parliament 
without the King's consent, and required any proposed draft legislation first to 
receive consent of the King's council in England; this tells us that Royal power 
in Ireland grew weak during the Hundred Years' War and the Wars of the 
Roses, and English colonists asserted themselves. The medieval Irish 
Parliament was Irish in the sense that it was in Ireland, not that it was of 
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Ireland: the pre-conquest Irish had possessed no common council, their heirs 
took little part in that Parliament, and their status remained that of "mere 
Irish". No Roman Catholic could sit in the Irish Parliament from 1782 to 1800, 
any more than under its eighteenth-century predecessors, although the near-
outlawed Catholicism remained the majority religion. But Irish constitutional 
nationalism arising as a mass movement, overwhelmingly Catholic, in the 
nineteenth century, demanded the restoration of the Irish Parliament, 
explicitly so doing under Daniel O'Connell, implicitly under Charles Stewart 
Parnell. The new national self-consciousness of the twentieth century returned 
to this tradition after initial flirtation with a pre-Norman "Golden Age" and 
with the fashionable sanctity of militarism. The great Irish novelist and short 
story writer Sean 6 Faolain, in his brilliant and seminal The Irishm, asserted: 
It was the Normans who first introduced the Irish mind to politics. 
They were our first Home Rulers. They did not think of Ireland as 
a nation, least of all as their nation, or bother about such symbols 
as Language, and they had no interest in ancient traditions, but 
they stood as sturdily for their religion and their land as, in the 
nineteenth century, an O'Connell for the one and a Davitt for the 
other; by which time, of course, Norman and Irish were 
completely commingled. They initiated politics as the word was to 
be understood in Ireland to the end of the Irish Parliamentary 
Party in 1922. 
6 Faolain, the product of an Anglophobic Irish war of independence in 
1919-21 and one of the intransigents who refused at the time to accept the 
settlement agreed by the majority in the illegal, self-created but 
constitutionally elected Irish representative assembly, Dail Eireann, showed 
grand generosity of mind in this constructive tribute to what his chapter 
entitled "The Norman Gift". But his reservation is important as regards Gaelic 
Ireland. The Irish Parliament at its extinction in 1800, like the Scottish 
Parliament at its extinction in 1707, was essentially hostile to Gaelic society, 
culture and traditions. Both Irish and Scottish nationalism have flourished 
particularly in Gaelic and post-Gaelic environments, or in those areas where 
Catholicism remained strongest which in Scotland was notably Banffshire. In 
Wales where no tradition of an independent constitutional assembly existed 
apart from the Parliaments of Owain Glyn Dwr in the early 14th century, and 
whose Union with England had been enacted in 1536 by Henry VIII, 
nationalism has been much more successful in asserting its cultural identity 
than in Ireland or Scotland. Hunger-strikes have been carried out by Irish 
nationalists, socialists and feminists, by Scottish opponents of conscription in 
time of war, but Wales alone has exhibited the phenomenon of a national 
leader ready to starve himself to death in the cause of his national language and 
its threatened extinction by the refusal of a Welsh-language television station. 
Gwynfor Evans's success achieved by Government fears of an explosion in the 
event of his death, is a reminder that issues are at stake in Wales which go far 
beyond questions of polls and elections, and that at its most profound such 
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nationalism in these_ i~lands transcends anything devolution by itself can 
answer. By contrast 1t 1s arguable that while political nationalism in Ireland 
and Scotland has advanced, cultural nationalism has been a far lower real as 
opposed to nominal priority. 
. l}~ste~ Pro!estantism, unlike Irish Protestantism, has had little formal 
1dentJflc~t10n With a pre-Union tradition of Irish Parliament. Presbyterianism, 
the . cutt10g-edge_ of Ulster Protes_tantism, saw that eighteenth-century 
Parhament, domu~ated by the established Protestant episcopalian Church of 
l~eland_, as th~ self1sh repository of privilege maintained at the expense of the 
d1ssent1~g al~1es who h~d. fought so well alongside it against the threat of 
Fre_n~h 10vas10n, Cat~o~1c 10surgence, and James VII. Ulster dissent, by now 
P?ht1cal as well as rehg10us, was prominent in extra-mural opposition to the 
"10dependent" Irish Parliament. This took remarkable forms which deserve 
mo~e ~ode_rn celebration than they obtain. The Rev. Professor Patrick J 
Consh _10 (~IS The Catholic Community in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centunes - quotes from a newspaper source of the day that in 1784 the Belfast 
Volunteers company 
paraded in full dress, and marched to Mass, where a sermon was 
preached by the Rev. Mr O'Connell, and a handsome collection 
was made to aid in defraying the expense of erecting the new 
Mass-house. Great numbers of the other Protestant inhabitants 
also attended. 
The f~rs! Catholic churc_h in . Be_Ifast was built largely on Protestant 
s~bscnpt10~s, and !he pubhc feehng 10 favour of Catholic emancipation at this 
t1m~ ~as h1ghe~t 10 Presbyterian circles influenced by the new climate of 
reg~1g10us equahty asserted by t~eir co-religionists in the newly independent 
Umted S~at~s. ~n both countnes the naturally democratic inclination of 
Presbytenamsm 10duced by its own religious organisation had its effects in the 
growt~ of a st~~ng political sense. The place of American Ulster Protestants in 
Amencan poht1cs IS well symbolised by the Democratic party's first standard-
bearer Andrew Jackson, born in the Carolinas two years after his parents' 
?eparture_from D~negal, and insofar as it is reasonable to speak of a "frontier" 
10fluence 10 Amencan _democratisation it derives much of its profile from the 
Ulster Prot~stants, children of frontiers in Ulster and, previously, on the 
Anglo-Scottish border. In Ireland Ulster Protestantism in the later nineteenth 
cen!ury cons<?l~dated itself into a heterogeneous unit in defence of the Union, 
aga10st the ns10~ power of newly-emancipated Irish Catholicism. But the 
effect. of that resistance was to produce in 1920 the one form of Home Rule 
these_1~lands have seen outside of the Isle of Man. Much has rightly been made 
of Bntlsh Tory complicity in playing "the Orange card", to employ the childish 
phrase of Lord Randolph Churchill, but the movement which dictated a 
sep~rate solution for the six counties of north-eastern Ulster in 1920 had been 
ach1eved by t~~ mobili~ation_ of mass Protestant worker support in 1912-14. No 
amount of Bnt1sh or Insh anstocratic intrigue could have got Ulster workmen 
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on the march without their own enthusiasm, and as for Ulster capitalist 
leadership, it was split into a few prominent Belfast Home Rulers, many 
Unionists, and a majority probably assuming they would control a Home Rule 
Ireland if it came (given the supposed ineptitude of Irish Catholics) but not 
against so intransigent a mass Unionist movement enjoying such influential 
sponsorship. Ulster Unionism in power was not conspicuously democratic, but 
it was democracy which had put it there. 
... Northern Ireland after 1920 ... For many years ... has 
apparently been a successful working model of regional self-
government. Our examination will suggest that this is due, not to 
the intrinsic excellence of devolution, but rather to the fact that 
the attitudes of Ulstermen were moulded by historical influences 
that have no counterpart in Britain. 
Thus R J Lawrence wrote in his influential The Government of Northern 
IrelancPl, and if his words look a little foolish today, those of us whose words 
do not look foolish on matters devolutionary after a quarter-century's lapse 
are either very fortunate or very banal: but the claim of uniqueness for 
devolution in Northern Ireland closes the door on self-instruction. 
Government proposed Devolution, thrice in Home Rule Bills for Ireland, 
then in the Government of Ireland Act (1920) with effective results for 
Northern Ireland, in response to mass movements in Ireland itself. But 
devolution as a Government response also derived from its place within the 
Unions of 1707 and 1800 themselves. The most obvious examples in Scotland's 
case are the separate Scottish legal system, and the separate church 
establishment, and to these must be added the long tradition of separate 
Scottish administration. As for Ireland, devolution was built into its Union 
settlement in less obvious but as it proved more abrasive forms. Both Unions 
were the product of international problems, which immediately strengthened 
the measures' impetus but compounded long-term problems in the 
constriction from immediate crisis: the dominant fear in 1707 was that war with 
Louis XIV would produce a Jacobite restoration in Scotland, and the 
dominant fear in 1800 was that war with Napoleon would produce a French 
invasion of Ireland. The Union of 1800 conspicuously failed to provide 
Catholic emancipation, although its architect, William Pitt, had envisaged that 
insurance, only to be frustrated by his adversaries' mobilisation of the 
Protestant conscience of George III, and when Catholic emancipation became 
law in 1829, it was a clear-cut surrender to popular pressure conceded with a 
very bad grace whence bringing no grateful response from its beneficiaries. 
But a different anomaly lay at the heart of that Union. In representation, the 
countries were united. In administration, Ireland was treated as an imperial 
possession, with the retention of a government-appointed viceroy and Chief 
Secretary supported by a permanent civil service. 
The Hiberno-British Union of 1800 failed in England: there simply was 
no readiness to take its meaning of common identity seriously. The symbolic 
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implications of the retention of the viceroy, and the refusal of promised 
Catholic emancipation, gave a clear signal from the ruling classes that 
whatever that Union meant, it did not mean that an Englishman must also 
consider himself an Irishman, and consider an Irishman an Englishman. The 
viceroy was apparently intended to be abolished; his existence was simply 
maintained in a prolonged fit of absence of mind (that same quality 
subsequently credited with the acquisition ofthe British Empire), and finally, 
after a third of a century, talk about dropping the viceroy petered out. By that 
time a massive political machine had arisen among the Irish Catholics behind 
Daniel O'Connell, bringing with it a further problem. Mass participation of an 
alien people in the activity of representative government meant that what had 
been the common factor in British and Irish experience recognised in the 
enactment of Parliamentary Union, was so no longer. Irish politics had spread 
far beyond the boundaries of class and caste which had contained them under 
the separate Irish Parliament: English politics still remained largely restricted 
to the ruling class, into which bourgeois representatives were trickling on 
aristocratic terms. Daniel O'Connell acquired extraordinary leverage on Whig 
government in the later 1830s through the secret Lichfield House compact; he 
also became possibly the greatest orator in Parliament of his time. He was still 
viewed in England as an alien representative of a despised and feared people 
requiring colonial-style administration. In his own person, ironically, he 
brought Ireland closer to participation in Union government that it would 
again obtain in the nineteenth century. His resumption of the cry "Repeal of 
the Union" was a rallying-call to his followers when he was unable to exert 
sufficient pressure on government, ie during the Whig Grey administration of 
the early 1830s, and after 1841 when the Whigs had been supplanted by his old 
enemy Sir Robert Peel. In other words, "Repeal" was a good method of 
holding his forces together when participation in Union government was 
temporarily out of his hands. It was given greater substance by the retention of 
a separate identity in Irish administration. 
The ecological disaster of the Great Famine of 1845-50 ended O'Connell's 
hope~, but his imprison~en_t after calling off the last of his "monster" Repeal 
meetmgs, at Clontarf, m his year of greatest Repeal agitation, 1843, was a 
piec~ of po~itical spite (I~ter overturned by the House of Lords) which again 
remmded his mass followmg that for all of his success Ireland remained subject 
to the normal considerations of colonial rule. As for the Famine, it is true that 
Peel showed himself the foremost statesman of his time in his conviction that 
the state must attempt to combat the disaster, but the million-plus who died, 
and the great numbers who emigrated, remained an indictment of a Union 
which purported to answer Irelands' needs. It is apparently at this point that 
the majority of Irish opinion hardened against the Union; but it would also 
seem that the mass of English opinion convinced itself the starvation problem 
was fundamentaly Irish, and therefore not English. Even in its most 
philanthropic responses, English public opinion talked of the famine with 
something of the benevolent, detached horror which could also be 
found among United States citizens: if the incursion of hordes of starving Irish 
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limited the detachment, and the benevolence, this would be true in the United 
States also. Ireland remained a possession rather than an integral part of the 
United Kingdom, in most English minds. Certainly many of the ruling classes 
during the Victorian era spoke of the working classes as though they, also, 
belonged to an alien order of humanity whose true reward lay in being 
permitted to serve. But religion and race maintained further dimensions 
dividing the peoples of the two islands, reckoning popular composition by its 
majority affiliation. Yet although devolution had been a popular cry when 
O'Connell's discomfiture in Westminster politics demanded its resurrection, 
and although the Famine seems to have left the Union a moral bankrupt in 
Irish Catholic opinion, it was the surviving Irish Protestant episcopalian elite 
who brought devolution into Irish politics on what proved a serious level, just 
as it was their counterparts in the British ruling elite who had maintained so 
much of it in Irish administration. A federal scheme had been projected as 
early as 1844 by an Ulster Protestant landlord, Sharman Crawford. In 1870 the 
Home Government Association came into being with Catholic support, but 
under Protestant leadership. In part the impetus for its formation came from 
Irish Protestant disillusionment with a Union whose legislation for the first 
time threatened the symbols of their own power, other than those specifically 
eroded by the transfer of Irish legislative activity to London: the disestablish-
ment of the Protestant episcopalian Church of Ireland (1869) was a symbolic 
gesture by Gladstone's first Administration to conciliate Irish Catholics while 
giving them in practice very little, and strengthen its support among Irish 
Presbyterians, but its effects were to be disastrous for the Liberal party in 
Ireland. Nemesis followed in the general election of 1874, fortified by the 
enactment of the secret ballot, and the indolence of the ensuing Tory 
government in the face of another mounting Irish agrarian crisis threw the 
Home Rule party, as it had now become, into much more intransigent hands. 
It is clear that the first Home Rule leader, the genial Isaac Butt, was a 
federalist; it is anything but clear what Charles Stewart Parnell, elected party 
Leader after the 1880 general election, meant by Home Rule, other than that 
he almost certainly did not mean separation. F S L Lyons has analysed what 
can be deduced of his meaning in a valuable article, "The Political Ideas of 
Parnell"<4l, not wholly subsumed into his major biography Charles Stewart 
PameJf5l the conclusion is that Parnell was asking for something much closer 
to the O'Connell demand for "Repeal", ie the restoration of the Irish 
Parliament with the newly-enfranchised masses voting in Irish representatives 
unswayed by the Whitehall bribery which had initially controlled, and 
ultimately ended the Irish Parliament of the eighteenth century. But when 
Gladstone in the general election of 1885 was faced by Parnell's instruction to 
the Irish voters in Britain (with some exceptions in specific constituencies) to 
vote Tory, and by the successful candidacy of the Pamellite T P O'Connor in 
the Scotland division of Liverpool, the temptation to regain future Irish votes 
in Britain by a generous devolutionary gesture to an Ireland now virtually 
denuded of Liberal MPs resulted in a judicious leak of his intentions. The 
Tories now dropped Parnell. Gladstone then returned to power with Parnellite 
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support, lost the conservative wing of his party under Lord Hartington (the 
few Radicals who crossed the floor in the wake of Joseph Chamberlain being 
numerically insignificant), lost the First Home Rule Bill on the Second 
Reading and then the subsequent general election of 1886, and consolidated 
his hold on his own party now firmly linked to an alliance with Irish politicians 
(in Ireland) and Irish voters (in Britain). 
This, the first major proposed devolutionary legislation in the 
Westminster Parliament, has elicited historiographical reactions ranging from 
the grand liberal declaration of Gladstonian ideological conviction, J L 
Hammond's work Gladstone and the Irish Nation<6), a work of exceptional 
generosity of mind, to the sardonic iconoclastic assertion of Gladstonian 
political self-interest, A B Cooke and John Vincent, The Governing Passion: 
Cabinet Government and Party Politics in Britain 1885-8(f7l, a work of 
exceptional subtlety of mind. It is in fact possible to combine their conclusions. 
Gladstone was probably much more concerned with political manoeuvre and 
party purge in 1886 than Hammond imagined, and to that extent the first 
Home Rule Bill was not serious, and was not expected to become Law: had it 
not been defeated in the Commons it would certainly have failed in the Lords. 
A G Donaldson, a distinguished Irish constitutional scholar with extensive 
experience as a Stormont legal draftsman, has given his oral opinion that it was 
very badly drafted, which again suggests that it was not taken very seriously by 
its creator. Donaldson thinks very highly of the draftsmanship of the Home 
Rule Bill of 1893; certainly it was intended to rivet the Irish vote in Britain to 
Liberal electoral fortunes still more emphatically (all the more needfully in 
view of Gladstone's well-known part in the fall of Parnell whose memory still 
retained the affections of a minority, not a contemptible minority, of Irish 
loyalties in both islands), but Gladstone himself had now become a full 
ideological convert to Home Rule. If his great speeches had converted nobody 
else, they converted himself. Gladstone at 84 was not ready to mount an 
assault on the veto power of the Lords, after it torpedoed his Second Home 
Rule Bill, and had he done so he would have faced his most brilliant rebel to 
date in his heir and ultimate successor, Lord Rosebery, for Rosebery would 
break from the party over destruction of the Lords' veto in the Parliament Act 
of 1911. However limited Gladstone's devolutionism, nonetheless he had 
legitimised it. We still cannot rule out party manoeuvre from his motivations. 
By leaving the Liberal party with an unfulfilled agenda for Irish Home Rule, 
necessarily tied to reform of the powers of the Second Chamber, he ensured 
that his successors would remain overshadowed by his memory and also (did 
he desire such a thing?) short-lived as leaders. Rosebery's imperialism, Sir 
William Harcourt's authoritarianism, rapidly gave way to the much more 
Gladstonian Sir Henry Campbeii-Bannerman and the architect of the Third 
Home Rule Bill, H H Asquith. 
Although the First Home Rule Bill had won Parnell's support, it was very 
far from meeting the expectations Parnell had aroused, or those to which he 
seems to have been committed. One qualification must be added to F S L 
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Lyons's most perceptive reflections. Parnell was half-American; it is clear that 
his mother's supposed influence in an Anglophobic direction has been greatly 
exaggerated, both in what it amounted to, and in its impact on him, but his 
grandfather, Admiral Charles Stewart, had been an American nav~l war hero 
against Britain, and he bore that grandfather's n~me as well ~s h1_s legacy of 
victory. This gave him a very different psycholog1cal outlook m h1s relat10ns 
with British politics from those of his predecessors in Irish nationalist 
leadership. The tremendous support of native Americans, as distinct from the 
also highly supportive Irish-Americans, in his great tour of ~he first mont~~ of 
1880 and in furnishing moral reinforcement and the smews of pohtlcal 
machinery subsequently, would have conditioned him towards American 
examples. The appeal of devolution in his case may have been very much 
bound up with the knowledge he had acquired of the former Confederate 
states from a six-month residence in Alabama in 1871, and from his subsequent 
knowledge of the undisturbed self-rule conceded to those states from 1877. His 
former Fenian supporters wanted to export the principle of a Republic from 
the USA but Parnell, while fairly contemptuous of British Royalty (unlike 
O'Connell, who idolised the young Victoria in an affectionately paternal 
style), showed no inclination to sunder the monarchical connection formally 
established by Henry VIII. His economic ideas were protectionist, again with 
some American influence at work, but he was evidently ready to take what 
devolution he could get, and make the most of it. 
Parnell accepted Gladstone's 1886 solution of Irish Home Rule without 
continued Westminster representation, apparently because he thought this 
would mean Jess opportunity of British interference with an Ireland under 
devolution. He was more concerned with Irish control of customs and excise 
than with the niceties of Ireland sitting or not sitting in two places at once, and 
hence was disinclined to pressurize Gladstone on what meant less to him; but 
was certainly prepared to accept Westminster seats if Gladstone should be 
converted to their concession (to which, by 1893, he was converted). An 
important pressure on Parnell himself on the question was that of Cecil 
Rhodes and the £10,000 he gave Parnell for the Home Rule cause, following 
negotiations with Parnell in which he later quoted himself (to Parnell's 
biographer Richard Barry O'Brien) as asserting: 
1) If the Irish members are excluded, nothing will persuade the 
English people but that Home Rule means separation; that 
Home Rule is the thin end of the wedge, and that when you get 
it you will next set up a republic, or try to do so. As long as the 
English people feel this, how can you expect to get Home Rule? 
That is the political question as it affects you. 
2) Next there is the personal question, if you like, which affects 
me. I want Imperial Federation. Home Rule with the Irish 
members in the Imperial Parliament will be the beginning of 
Imperial Federation. Home Rule with the Irish members 
excluded from the Imperial Parliament would lead nowhere, so 
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far as my interests, which are Imperial interests, are concerned. 
But in the event, the realisation of Devolution in the British Isles (other 
than the Isle of Man), did not take effect until the decline, if not the fall of the 
British Empire. That Lloyd George disappointed no connoisseurs of his flair 
for perversity by restricting devolution to the one part of Ireland which insisted 
it did not want it, is notorious; but how unwanted it really was is a nice 
question. Certainly the Ulster Unionist leaders and their military allies, secret 
or open, looked more and more like imperialism in its last redoubt. Northern 
Ireland became a sealed time-capsule for imperial values, intended for display 
rather ~han for use save among troublesome native (ie Irish aboriginal) 
populations: ~argaret Thatcher, herself tuned into that century-old rhetoric, 
blew up the time-capsule when having continually spoken on its wave-length, 
she switched off to negotiate the Unionist-ignoring Anglo-Irish Agreement; 
and t~e ~revious rhetoric~) unison embittered the awakening immeasurably. 
(The md1fference of Dubhn and London to courtesies for Scotland and Wales 
in the term "Anglo-Irish", is as instructive as the deliberate humiliation ofth~ 
Unionists.) 
There was a strong, if surreptitious, continuum from Parnellism to 
Cars?~is~ in method, though emphatically not in personnel; and method had 
conditiomng effects for ideology. Edward Carson learned much from Parnell 
including the use of hard-bitten revolutionish rhetoric added to non-violenc~ 
as a tactic, witness his superb success after Summer 1912 in keeping his (in 
mo~e senses_th_an ~ne) pre-war movement free from the anti-Catholic rioting 
:-vh!ch h~d d1st1_ngmshed Pr?testant Ulster at moments of perceived danger to 
Its I~en~I~Y dunng the previOus half-century. George A Birmingham, a witty 
and InCISive UlsJfr Protestant novelis~, created his political fantasy The Red 
Han';i of Uls~er around the assumption of a Carson-style revolt financed by 
an . m~conciieable Irish-American Anglophobe who found the Ulster 
U n!omsts a .~uch more appealing breeding- ground for hatred of England than 
the!r ~oncihatory_ R~dmondite Home Ruler rivals. Ultimately Ulster 
Umomsm stated Its mterest in devolution (through the mouth of future 
~orthern Ireland premier James Craig's big brother Charles Curtis Craig, MP) 
m the Commons debate of 29 March 1920: 
We do not in any way desire to recede from a position which has 
been in every way satisfactory to us, but we have many enemies in 
this coun~ry. [ie Britain apparently, not the United Kingdom of 
Great Bntam and Ireland], and we feel that an Ulster without a 
Parli_amen~ of its ow~ would not be in nearly as strong a position as 
one m which a Parliament had been set up where the Executive 
had been appointed and where above all the paraphernalia of 
Government was already in existence. We believe that so long as 
we were without a Parliament of our own constant attacks would 
be made upon us, and constant atttempts would be made ... to 
draw us into a Dublin Parliament. ... We profoundly distrust the 
Labour party and we profoundly distrust the Right Hon. 
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gentleman the member for Paisley [H H Asquith]. We believe 
that if either of those parties, or the two in combination, were 
once more in power, our chances of remaining a part of the United 
Kingdom would be very small indeed. We see our safety, 
therefore, in having a Parliament of our own, for we believe that 
once a Parliament is set up and working well ... we should fear no 
one, and feel we should then be in a position of absolute security 
... and therefore I say that we preler to have a Parliament, 
although we do not want one of our own. 
There is a striking similarity between this statement and the present position of 
the Craigs' heirs in the official Unionist party in Northern Ireland today, 
including the fears of government under the present Labour party with or 
without the support of the present heirs of the Asquithian Liberals. Unstated 
then, more clearly evident now, are inclusions of Tories in these fears of 
"enemies in this country". The distinction is that today Northern Ireland 
Unionists have the memory of a Parliament- their Stormont- whence to draw 
inspiration and conclusions. (The nearest equivalent in Charles Craig's mind 
seems to have been a covert allusion to the "Provisional Government" agreed 
on by the Carsonite Unionists on 24 September 1913 as intended to take effect 
with a five-member Executive and 75 members in the event of Home Rule 
becoming law. The term was appropriated by Patrick Pearse and adopted for 
the Irish Republic by himself and his six co-signatories of the proclamation 
which inaugurated the Easter Rising of 1916. Pearse's Provisional 
Government had the support of only a few hundred, at best, when he launched 
the Proclamation; Carson's, and the Craigs', in Ulster, would have spoken for 
tens ofthousands.) 
Vern~n Bogdanor, in his r~flective_ and impressively comparative study of 
the question throughout this archipelago, Devolution(9l(1979) quotes 
approvingly the distinguished Irish Protestant scholar Nicholas Mansergh 's 
The Government of Northern Ireland: a study in Devolution< 10l (1936): "no 
scheme of Devolution is likely to satisfy a demand for self-government 
prompted by national sentiment ... [Devolution] suggests only a means 
whereby better government may be secured within a single State. Its value 
disappears once the unity of the State is questioned". But how far was it 
questioned, other than by the separatist minority? Many, perhaps most, 
historians would follow Professor John A Murphy in his Ireland in the 
Twentieth Century/11 l where he emphatically denies that the overwhelming 
vote for Sinn Fein in 1918 was a vote for a Republic. A separatist minority 
today questions the unity of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, but an overwhelming majority in Northern Ireland seeks no 
more than devolution. National sentiment fuels devolutionist demand in 
Scotland and Wales, and certainly government proposals for devolution 
require to be integrated with a sense of such sentiment, founded on practical 
enquiry rather than Westminster assumptions of confident wisdom. Home 
Rule legislation was originally proposed by Gladstone with almost 
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unbelievably little consultation with the Parnellites whose alliance he sought. 
But in its avowed purpose, "better government", Home Rule offered an 
implicit agenda from which its party preoccupations prevented its pursuing. 
Today "better government" has to consider reform for the entire United 
Kingdom as long overdue. If Northern Ireland is to return to a devolved 
legislature, in place of its present situation so reminiscent of the devolved 
administration in Ireland throughout the United Kingdom ofthe two islands, it 
must be accompanied by built-in safeguards not only for the minority but also 
for the population at large. A Bill of Rights must be written into any 
devolution proposal, and the official Unionists are apparently committed to 
such a step. It is equally necessary in the several parts of Britain whether 
individually seeking devolution or supposedly resisting it. Voting reform, 
specifically including a thorough scheme of proportional representation, is 
demanded in Scotland and appears for various reasons essential for Wales and 
for Northern Ireland: but it is also vital to England, whose method of choosing 
a government in recent years has become unrepresentative in the extreme. 
Customs and excise, so long a hidden obstacle on the road to satisfactory 
devolution in Ireland, diminishes in significance with the growth of European 
Community consolidation. Separation of judicial and executive legislative 
powers requires far more than the lip-service it normally obtains. Any 
devolution settlement requires something akin to written constitutional 
provisions: the best footing for Bills of Rights is that of a written constitution. 
What is needed in the next round of devolution is to learn from past 
history, to compare the different areas under discussion, to avoid either 
imprisonment in history or indifference to it, and to make a virtue of 
multiplicity of experience in considering possible improvements. Northern 
Ireland can no longer be treated in isolation, either from Irish history in 
general, or from the national aspirations of Scotland and Wales. Solution-
search in Northern Ireland, in particular as it examines prospects for 
devolution, must take into account the likelihood of a devolved Scotland, 
possibly a devolved Wales, in any future existence of Northern Ireland. Mr 
Charles Haughey regularly reminds his Fianna Fail party in annual 
conferences that Ulster peace depends on the Republic's acquisition of 
Northern Ireland (as demanded under article 2 of the Irish Constitution of 
1937): Mr Haughey has no part in any breaches of Northern Ireland peace, the 
thought is unimaginable to his party, but his theorem is simply that those who 
breach it will only desist when the island is made a political unity, and he 
evidently does not interpret unity as a 26-country return to some form of 
United Kingdom (although the use of the term "reunification" about Ireland 
can point to no period in time when the Irish people were a political unity of 
persons enjoying equality before the law prior to 1829). Mr Haughey's 1,200-
page collected speeches, The Spirit of the Nation<12), is edited by his leading 
intellectual, Mr Martin Mansergh, son of the late Cambridge Professor 
Nicholas Mansergh (who did not share his offspring's political allegiance). The 
Haughey formula on Northern Ireland solution (subject to what mutations 
may yet surface at the negotiating table) speaks of some vague devolution 
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being permissable once "unity" of the Irish island is affirmed by Dublin and 
London- and here it is Mansergh senior rather than Mansergh junior who may 
be of service, in that it is difficult to see devolution as an option in a 32-county 
Ireland "once the unity of the State is questioned", as the million Protestants 
now in Northern Ireland would certainly question it. Nor does Mr Haughey, 
whatever may be the views of the younger Mansergh, show much respect for a 
tradition of devolution in Irish history; nor does he indicate much interest in 
the future devolutionary implications of Wales and Scotland, for all of the 
historic support for Irish Home Rule given by Scots and Welsh Home Rulers 
(with exceptions such as David Lloyd George). Devolution, then, also 
becomes important in the Irish context as an illumination of proposals of 
interested outsiders. 
The practical advantages of Mr Haughey's Republic as a testing-ground 
for political experiment should compel very close attention; despite his own 
party's continued attempts to abolish proportional representation, the system 
has produced remarkable political stability, impressive capacity for achieving 
status for minorities, and a judicious means of limiting the rule of 
authoritarians such as himself. The second chamber existing at present, and its 
earlier status between 1922 and 1936, invite constructive reflection on the 
minority interests such a chamber enfranchises: eg you give a seat to W B 
Yeats in 1922, you take it back after he has complained against your outlawry 
of divorce. The second-chamber issue is far from clear-cut, as may be seen 
from the mid-1930s debate of de Valera and his opponents, balancing the 
legitimate interests minorities sought to preserve (though, as Yeats could 
testify, without much conspicuous success) versus the extent to which their 
sanctuary in the legislature opposed the common good (whose Aristotelian-
Thomist definition was firmly in de Valera's mind). But even the emasculated 
Senate of de Valera's constitution enshrined the (as it would prove) valuable 
voices of (some) elected representatives of university graduate opinion. The 
idea of second chambers in which Seamus Heaney, Sorley Maclean, or 
Norman MacCaig, might state their opinions of governmental legislation as 
they chose, offers a far superior means of taking counsel of the higher points of 
human intellect than does the House of Lords. In Wales a culturally-
cogniscant second chamber is a vital necessity. Again, the self-evident danger 
to human freedom which Mr Haughey poses in his own person should 
concentrate the mind wonderfully on the virtues of a written constitution and a 
formal separation of the judicial power from the executive-legislative. 
But Scotland will also have lessons of its own to offer Irish, Welsh and-
will they but listen - English students of devolution. The establishment of a 
democratically-administered established church, historically refreshed by its 
own disruption and return to its congregations for support, has supplied the 
means of enlivening popular consciousness in the past and invites the attention 
of comparable bodies in other countries. As matters now exist,both in the 
Republic (for all practical purposes) and in Northern Ireland (under the 1869 
legislation disestablishing the Church of Ireland) church and state are 
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separated; they are also separated in Wales; but in Ireland and Wales the place 
of these churches in effectual social comment is far higher than, say, that of the 
established Church of England, in England. I see little reason for Scotland to 
disestablish her Church, but there is something to be said for the Irish example 
of pointedly deferring to as many religious sects at the same time as possible, as 
far as symbolic listening goes. The comparable cases also enable one to study 
the limits of religious influence in intensely religious societies (eg why has 
Catholicism so little impact on practising Catholics in Northern Ireland against 
the IRA?). 
There remains also the questions devolution has failed to reach in the 
past, but is being invited to consider in the future. Labour is committed to a 
Scottish legislature whose representation would be evenly balanced according 
to the sexual balance of the population, and there would be much for all 
portions of the United Kingdom to learn from that provision. To put matters 
cynically, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have divided themselves so 
publicly on religious questions that it is time they united in considering an issue 
where their history has been in accord- that of keeping women subordinate. 
To put matters crudely, it is well-known that Englishmen staff a vast number of 
key positions in Scottish culture today, a circumstance partly dictated by the 
English preponderance in the United Kingdom, partly by the ingrained 
Scottish cringe ready to assume an English product of an English university 
with membership of an English club sporting an English accent is what 
Scotland requires- the cringe is no longer flaunted, but it is still a Pavlovian 
response. But while experience shows that a Scotsman can frequently do a 
Scots job better than an Englishman, even if only from knowledge of what 
Scotland is, experience also suggests a Scotswoman can usually do it better 
still, simply because the continued exclusion of women means that the best 
alone can persevere in a social system so weighed against them. It is merely 
courtesy that restrains me from giving examples. Positive discrimination is 
questionable as a rule, but in this instance there seems no other way to shift the 
male posterior from political near-monopoly, and on all possible grounds that 
is essential with maximum speed. Any arguments as to the career of Margaret 
Thatcher, who has done so much to stimulate Scottish, Welsh and Northern 
Irish impulses to devolution, must break down in the face of Oscar Wilde's 
analysis: "Half of Mrs Thatcher's success lies in the no doubt unfounded 
rumour that she is a woman." 
Owen Dudley Edwards, Department of History, University of Edinburgh. 
August 1991 
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